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Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Manufacturing Co.: Abolishing the
Exclusive Remedy Requirement for the Scheduled Injuries
Section of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act
Remedies provided under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act'
are directed toward quick recovery, limited litigation, and relatively ascertainable awards. 2 For total incapacity and partial incapacity, sections 97-29 and 9730 compensate employees based on a percentage of weekly wages for the period
they are disabled.3 For injuries falling within a particular schedule, section 9731 requires recovery in the form of limited, legislatively-created amounts without considering the employees' inability to earn future wages. 4 Section 97-31
states that recovery provided under this schedule "shall be in lieu of all other
compensation." 5 The North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted this clause
to mean that if a specific injury is included in the schedule, the employee must
take the recovery dictated under section 97-31 without considering total or par1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1985).
2. See Taylor v. J.P. Stevens and Co., 59 N.C. App. 643, 645, 292 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1982),
modified and aff'd, 307 N.C. 392, 298 S.E.2d 681 (1983) (citing Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Company,
266 N.C. 419, 423, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966)).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-29 to -30 (1985). Section 97-29 reads in part:
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, where the incapacity for work resulting from the
injury is total, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid, as hereinafter provided, to the
injured employee during such total disability a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and
two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of his average weekly wages, but not more than the amount
established annually to be effective October 1 as provided herein, nor less than thirty dollars ($30.00) per week.
Id. § 97-29. Section 97-30 reads in part:
Except as otherwise provided in G.S. 97-31, where the incapacity for work resulting from
the injury is partial, the employer shall pay, or cause to be paid, as hereinafter provided, to
the injured employee during such disability, a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and
two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the difference between his average weekly wages before
the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but not more
than the amount established annually to be effective October I as provided in G.S. 97-29 a
week, and in no case shall the period covered by such compensation be greater than 300
weeks from the date of injury.
Id. § 97-30.
4. Id. 97-31. Section 97-31 reads in part:
In cases included by the following schedule the compensation in each case shall be paid for
disability during the healing period and in addition the disability shall be deemed to continue for the period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other compensation, including
disfigurement, to wit:
(1) For the loss of a thumb, sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the average
weekly wages during 75 weeks.
(2) For the loss of a first finger, commonly called the index finger, sixty-six and twothirds percent (66 2/3%) of the average weekly wages during 45 weeks.
(24) In case of the loss of or permanent injury to any important external or internal organ
or part of the body for which no compensation is payable under any other subdivision of
this section, the Industrial Commission may award proper and equitable compensation not
to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).
Id. § 97-31.
5. Id. § 97-31.
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tial incapacity. 6 Application7 of this interpretation has produced some incongruous and inequitable results.

In Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co.8 the North Carolina Supreme

Court addressed whether a worker whose injuries are included in section 97-31
may instead recover under section 97-29 when those injuries result in permanent

total disability. 9 In a 4-3 decision, the court overruled previous cases which had
held that section 97-31 was designed to operate exclusively if the injury was

enumerated within its provisions. 10 This Note examines the reasoning that led

the court to such a drastic reinterpretation of the "in lieu of" provision. The

Note then considers the results of the decision and whether these results parallel
the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. ,The Note concludes by ques-

tioning the power of the court to transform completely the interpretation of a
statute which had been undisputed by the courts and the North Carolina Gen-

eral Assembly since the adoption of the statute in 1943.11
Plaintiff in Whitley was employed by defendant as a cabinet maker.1 2 He
was injured when a piece of wood flew from a saw and struck his left hand and

right arm. 13 As a result, plaintiff experienced partial permanent disability of
75% in his right hand and 30% in his left hand.14 The Industrial Commission
found that the employee could neither read nor write, was too old for job retraining, and because of loss of strength and dexterity, could not return to manual labor.15 Consequently, the Commission held that plaintiff was permanently
and totally disabled and entitled to recover under section 97-29.16

6. Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 93-94, 249 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1978) (employee
who suffered a 50 percent permanent partial disability of the back must recover under section 97-31
although his injury and background rendered him unable to find work). For a discussion of the
exclusiveness of scheduled allowances and a related survey of state case law throughout the country,
see 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, §§ 58.20 to .23, at 10-344.44 to .86 (1987).
7. The exclusivity of the scheduled section is especially difficult on uneducated, elderly workers because their recovery is inevitably low and their age and education precludes job retraining.
See, eg., West v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc., 62 N.C. App. 267, 302 S.E.2d 645 (1983) (plaintiff
had a fifth grade education and worked thirty-five years in cotton mills where he was exposed to high
levels of cotton dust. When his employer's plant closed down, he was denied rehire elsewhere because testing showed impairment in his lungs; the Industrial Commission awarded him six thousand
dollars.); Cook v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 562, 300 S.E.2d 852 (1983) (plaintiff,
62, who worked for most of her adult life in a cotton mill exposed to cotton dust, was unable to find
another job when her employer's plant closed; the Industrial Commission awarded her three thousand dollars for lung impairment.).
8. 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
9. Id. at 95, 348 S.E.2d at 339.
10. Id. at 96, 348 S.E.2d at 340. Justices Billings, Branch, and Meyer dissented.
11. See Act of March 5, 1943, ch. 502, § 2, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 556, 556-88 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1985)) (amendingAct of March 11, 1929, ch. 120, § 31, 1929 N.C. Pub. Laws
117, 130-31).
12. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 90, 348 S.E.2d at 337.
13. Id.
14. Id. Although the injury was to plaintiff's right arm, the Industrial Commission awarded
compensation according to the percentage of disability of plaintiff's right hand. Id. at 90-91, 348
S.E.2d at 337-38.
15. Id. at 91, 348 S.E.2d at 337.
16. Id. at 92, 348 S.E.2d at 338.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the Commission's award. 1 7
The court held that past decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court dic-

tated the conclusion that section 97-31 was the sole remedy for workers with
scheduled injuries.1 8 Looking primarily at Perry v. HibritenFurnitureCo., 19 the
court of appeals cited the unambiguous holding of the higher court that recovery
cannot be made under section 97-29 "[w]hen all... injuries are included in the
schedule set out in G.S. 97-31, the injured employee is entitled to compensation
20
exclusively under G.S. 97-31 regardless of his ability or inability to work."
Because the Commission had found no disability resulting from the accident

except for the hand injuries, the court of appeals felt that section 97-31 compen21
sation was mandatory.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, believing that the phrase "in lieu of all
other compensation" should be reconsidered, granted certiorari. 22 In reaching a

decision that overrules Perry, the North Carolina Supreme Court relied heavily
on the general assembly's adoption of the clause after the court's 1942 ruling in
Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co.23 In that case the court allowed an employee
who had lost the use of his left leg and right foot to recover under section 9729.24 The Stanley court also held that if an employee suffered both disfigurement and loss of use of a bodily part, he may recover twice under separate provi-

sions of section 97-31. 25 In the next session, the general assembly amended
section 97-31 to include the phrase, "shall be in lieu of all other compensation,
including disfigurement". 2 6 The court in Whitley argued that the phrase was
adopted to preclude double recovery for disfigurement rather than to make section 97-31 operate as an exclusive remedy. 27 Additionally, the Whitley Court

felt that subsequent actions of the general assembly to strike the time limitations
on section 97-29 indicated that the general assembly intended "to address the

plight of a worker who suffers an injury permanently abrogating his earning
17. Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 78 N.C. App. 217, 336 S.E.2d 642 (1985), rev'd,
318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
18. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 218, 336 S.E.2d at 643.
19. 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978), overruled by Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co.,
318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
20. Whitley, 78 N.C. App. at 218, 336 S.E.2d at 642-43 (citing Perry, 296 N.C. at 93-94, 249
S.E.2d at 401).
21. See Whitley, 78 N.C. App. at 218, 336 S.E.2d at 643.
22. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 95, 348 S.E.2d at 339.
23. 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942); see Whitley, 318 N.C. at 95-96, 348 S.E.2d at 340-41.
24. Stanley, at 260-61, 22 S.E.2d at 572-73.
25. Id. at 265, 22 S.E.2d at 576.
26. Act of March 5, 1943, ch. 502, § 2, 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws 556, 556-58 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1985)) (amending Act of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, § 31, 1929 N.C. Pub. Laws
117, 130-3 1). Before this amendment, the pertinent part of Section 97-31 read: "In cases included by
the following schedule, the disability in each case shall be deemed to continue for the period specified, and the compensation so paid for such injury shall be specified therein .... " 1929 N.C. Sess.
Laws ch. 120, § 31. The amended statute reads: "In cases included by the following schedule the
compensation in each case shall be paid for disability during the healing period and in addition the
disability shall be deemed to continue for the periods specified, and shall be in lieu of all other
compensation, including disfigurement ..
" 1943 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 502, § 2 (emphasis added).
27. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 97, 348 S.E.2d at 340.
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ability." 28 The court believed that these actions revealed an obvious intent by
the general assembly for the worker to be able to choose the most favorable
29
remedy.
The court also wrote that its new interpretation of the "in lieu of" clause
was supported by policy considerations. 30 The goal of the Workers' Compensation Act is to compensate for the inability to earn wages. 31 The statute represents a trade-off between the employee and employer. 32 The employee gets
certain, though limited, compensation, while the employer loses the right to
deny liability, but is only liable for the loss of earning capacity. 33 Thus, the
court reasoned, "[a]llowing a totally and permanently disabled employee lifetime compensation effectuates the purpose of the Act to compensate for lost
'34
earning ability."
Finally, the Whitley court based its decision on certain well-accepted principles of statutory construction. 35 First, legislative intent controls and to determine that intent the court should examine "the language of the statute, the spirit
of the act, and what the statute seeks to accomplish."136 The Workers' Compensation Act, the court reasoned, must not be narrowly construed so as to deny
benefits. 37 Also, if any ambiguity exists in the statute, courts should resolve the

inconsistency to effectuate the legislative intent. 38 The supreme court therefore
concluded that the intent of the general assembly, the policy considerations, and
the inequity of restricting the employee's recovery required that section 97-31
not function as an exclusive remedy when the employee is totally and perma39
nently disabled.
This issue has a long history. The North Carolina Industrial Commission
Reports for the years 1929 through 1932 show that the full Commission wrestled with whether the general assembly intended to restrict the awards of workers with scheduled injuries:4° In the beginning of that period, the Act had only
been adopted for one year, and the section with schedules did not include the
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id. Larson has commented:
[The use of scheduled provisions] is not, however, to be interpreted as an erratic deviation from the underlying principle of compensation law-that benefits relate to loss of
earning capacity and not to physical injury as such. The basic theory remains the same;
the only difference is that the effect on earning capacity is a conclusively presumed one,
instead of a specifically proved one based on the individual's actual wage-loss experience.
2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 58.11, at 10-323 to -324 (footnotes omitted).
32. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 98, 348 S.E.2d at 341.
33. Id. at 98, 348 S.E.2d at 341.
34. Id. at 99, 348 S.E.2d at 342.
35. Id. at 98, 348 S.E.2d at 341.
36. Id.

37. Id. (citing Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 303, 188 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1972)),
38. Id.; see also Taylor v. Stevens and Co., 300 N.C. 94, 102, 265 S.E.2d 144, 148 (1980) (must
construe ambiguous statute to ascertain true legislative intent).
39. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 98, 348 S.E.2d at 341.
40. The North Carolina Industrial Commission Advance Sheets were initially published only
from October 1929 to July 1932.
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phrase "in lieu of all other compensation. '4 1 In Adams v. Buffalo Snowbird
Co.,42 plaintiff lost the distal phalange of his right index finger and was unable to
work for three months.4 3 In determining whether plaintiff could recover under
sections 97-29 and 97-31, the Commission noted that section 97-30 included
words that made it obvious that he could not receive compensation under both
sections 97-30 and 97-31. The statute, however, contained no language that
clearly indicated section 97-29 and section 97-31 could not provide double compensation. 44 Thus, the Commission granted section 97-29 compensation for
three months and thereafter section 97-31 compensation for the loss of the finger.4 5 In Kennedy v. Collins Granite Co., Inc. 46 the Commission further noted
that at the time the general assembly adopted the North Carolina Workmen's
Compensation Act it had before it the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act.4 7
The Virginia act was identical to the bill originally presented to the North Carolina general assembly and included the language, "and shall be in lieu of all
other compensation." s The general assembly left out the clause when it
adopted the North Carolina Act.49 Thus, in Rice v. Denny Role & Panel Co.,S°
the Commission concluded that the general assembly had recognized that to
provide an adequate remedy it was necessary to compensate for the potential
loss of earning power through the scheduled section and the actual wage loss
through the total incapacity section. 5 ' A different interpretation would mean
that in some instances, the worker would have to pay "in direct loss of wages...
'5 2
for the privilege of losing [a part of his body]."
53
Rice was ultimately appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court,
which noted that the Commission had always unanimously ruled that the sections do not function exclusively, and that the Commission's line of reasoning
best supported the purpose of the Act-to compensate injured workers.5 4 If a
worker loses a finger and returns to work immediately, section 97-31 fully compensates for his loss. If he is kept from his job by the injury, however, he cannot
be compensated adequately unless he can recover under section 97-29 for total
41. For the text of the original statute, see supra note 26.
42. 1 N.C. Indus. Comm'n 232 (1930).
43. Id. at 233.
44. Id. at 234.
45. Id. at 235.
46. 1 N.C. Indus. Comm'n 346 (1930).
47. Id. at 347; see Act of Mar. 21, 1918, ch. 97A, 1918 Va. Acts 637 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN.§ 65.1-56 (1950)).
48. Kennedy, 1 N.C. Indus. Comm'n at 347; Rice v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 1 N.C. Indus.
Comm'n 341, 342 (1930).
49. Rice, IN.C. Indus. Comm'n at 342-43. For the text of the original statute, see supra note
26.
50. 1 N.C. Indus. Comm'n at 341 (1930). Plaintiff suffered an injury by accident of his left
hand which required the amputation of the distal phalange of the second finger, and more than half
of the distal phalange of the third and fourth finger. Id. at 342.
51. Id. at 343.

52. Id. at 345.
53. Rice v. Denny Role & Panel Co., 199 N.C. 154, 154 S.E. 69 (1930).
54. Id. at 156, 154 S.E. at 70.
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disability.5 5 The court reasoned that the general assembly carefully chose the
language of section 97-31. Therefore, the omission of the phrase, "and shall be
in lieu of all other compensation," clearly indicated that the general assembly
intended to avoid a strict, exclusive interpretation. 56 The court thus affirmed
57
the Commission's holding.

In 1943, however, section 97-31 was amended to include the "in lieu of"
phrase, and thereafter the courts held that the exclusivity provision of 97-31 was

clear and mandatory.5 8 Scheduled injuries were compensated under the sched-

uled section only. In the following years, a growing number of states began to
allow employees with scheduled injuries further compensation under the "odd
lot" doctrine. 59 The basis of the theory was that the employer should compensate the worker fully if her injuries were so debilitating that she could not find
°
work, whether those injuries were scheduled or not.6

North Carolina courts, however, rejected the application of the doctrine. 6 1

In 1972, in two similar cases, Dudley v. Downtowner Moter Inn,62 and Loflin v.

Loflin, 63 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that even if employees were

completely unable to work because of age, education, or other reasons, they are

restricted to section 97-31 recovery. 64 In Loflin the court stated that the language of the statute was clear, and "[t]he fact that an injury is one of those
enumerated in the schedule of payments set forth under [section] 97-31 precludes the Commission from awarding compensation under any other provision
of the Act."'65 Evidence of personal characteristics which resulted in total capacity for a particular worker was irrelevant.
55. Id. at 158, 154 S.E. at 71.
56. Id. at 158-59, 154 S.E. at 72.
57. Id. at 159, 154 S.E. at 72.
58. See, ag., Watts v. Brewer, 243 N.C. 422, 424, 90 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1956); Loflin v. Loflin, 13
N.C. App. 574, 578-79, 186 S.E.2d 660, 663 (1972); Dudley v. Downtowner Motor Inn, 13 N.C.
App. 474, 479, 186 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1972).
59. For a discussion of the "odd lot" doctrine and its application in other states, see 2 A.
LARSON, supra note 6, § 57.51(a), at 10-164.65.
60. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 57.51(a), at 10-164.66.
61. See eg., Loflin, 13 N.C. App. at 578-79, 186 S.E.2d at 663; Dudley, 13 N.C. App. at 47778, 186 S.E.2d at 191; see Teague, Is a Scheduled Injury a Scheduled Injury?, 1979 INST. ON WORKERS' COMP. § 6, at 4 stating:
Mhe introductory language of G.S. 97-31 positively precludes the use of the "odd lot"
doctrine, or the finding of permanent and total disability, where the medical evidence
shows that the workers' injury is limited to a percentage disability of some portion of the
body listed in the 24 subsections of G.S. 97-31.
Id.
62. 13 N.C. App. 474, 186 S.E.2d 188 (1972).
63. 13 N.C. App. 574, 186 S.E.2d 660 (1972).
64. Plaintiff in Dudley was a 53-year-old woman with a seventh grade education who had
worked all her life as a cook. Although a compensable accident left her 55% disabled in her left hand
and unable to work, she was restricted to section 97-31 recovery. See Dudley, 13 N.C. App. at 475,
477-78, 186 S.E.2d at 189, 191.
Plaintiff in Loflin, a carpenter, suffered a 50% disability of his back as a result of a fall from
scaffolding. Although he could not remain in the same position for long without extreme pain and
was unable to return to his job, plaintiff nonetheless was forced to recover under section 97-31 only.
See Loflin, 13 N.C. App. at 575, 186 S.E.2d at 661.
65. Loflin, 13 N.C. App. at 578, 180 S.E.2d at 663 (citing Watts v. Brewer, 243 N.C. 422, 424,
90 S.E.2d 764, 767 (1956)).
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In Little v. Anson County Schools FoodService,66 decided in 1978, the same
year in which the court reaffirmed its exclusivity holding through Perry,67 the
North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that such characteristics as age, education, and physical infirmities must be addressed to determine the worker's actual incapacity. 68 The worker must be compensated for the real degree of

disability, not for the incapacity a twenty-year-old worker with the same injury
would experience. 69 In later cases North Carolina courts began to allow addi-

tional compensation if the scheduled injury caused further disability elsewhere,
such as through pain, numbness, or paralysis. 70 In 1983, for example, the North

Carolina Court of Appeals allowed two cotton mill employees with lung injuries
to recover under section 97-29 based on their age, education, and work experience. 7 1 Generally, however, the court of appeals followed the supreme court's
rule of exclusivity. 72 Increasingly, situations of extreme hardship were forcing
the court to realize the inequity of restricting all workers to the provisions of
section 97-31, and the court struggled to allow flexibility in the Commission's
decision-making process without totally overruling the exclusivity of 97-31.
In Fleming v. K-Mart Corp. 73 the supreme court granted total incapacity
recovery under section 97-29 to a worker with back and leg injuries. Plaintiff
sustained a compensable back injury which required surgery. As a result, he
had chronic back and leg pains which left him unable to remain in the same
position for any period of time. 74 Even though the court reversed the Commission's original section 97-31 award, it still did not use Fleming to overrule Perry
and the exclusivity rule. Instead, the court qualified the Perry decision by saying
that when the employee has lost both legs, section 97-31 specifically allows for
section 97-29 recovery anyway. 75 Still, the court made a sound assertion that if
66. 295 N.C. 527, 246 S.E.2d 743 (1978).
67. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
68. Id. at 531-33, 246 S.E.2d at 746-47. For a more complete discussion of Little and its anticipated impact on North Carolina Workers' Compensation law pre-Whitley, see Teague, supra note
61, at 5-6.
69. See Little, 295 N.C. at 531, 246 S.E.2d at 746.
70. See, eg., Jones v. Murdoch Center, 74 N.C. App. 128, 327 S.E.2d 294 (1985) (employee
with back injury that resulted in severe pain and numbness in extremities recovered under section
97-29); Davis v. Edgecomb Metals Co., 63 N.C. App. 48, 303 S.E.2d 612 (1983) (employee who
suffered posttraumatic neurosis with depressive reaction resulting from leg injury allowed to recover
outside of scheduled provision).
71. See West v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc., 62 N.C. App. 267, 270, 302 S.E.2d 645, 647
(1983); Cook v. Bladenboro Cotton Mills, Inc., 61 N.C. App. 562, 565, 300 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1983).
For a discussion of these two cases and the issue of section 97-31 exclusivity, see Note, North Carolina General Statutes Section 97-31: Must it provide Exclusive Compensationfor Workers Who Suffered Scheduled Injuries?, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1462 (1984).
72. See eg., Kendrick v. City of Greensboro, 80 N.C. App. 183, 341 S.E.2d 122 (1986) (citing
Perry v. Hibriten Furniture Co., 296 N.C. 88, 249 S.E.2d 397 (1978), overruledby Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E. 2d 336 (1986)).
73. 312 N.C. 538, 324 S.E.2d 214 (1985).
74. Id. at 540, 324 S.E.2d at 215.
75. Id. at 543, 324 S.E.2d at 219. The pertinent part of section 97-31 reads:
The loss of both hands, or both arms, or both feet, or both legs, or both eyes, or any
two thereof, shall constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according
to provisions of G.S. 97-29.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(17) (1985).
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a worker is injured such that her wage-earning capacity is impaired, she should
be compensated accordingly. The implication was that this result should be the
case whether the injuries were included in section 97-31 or not. The Fleming
decision highlighted the direction the court had chosen and provided the
groundwork on which the Whitley court abolished the rule of exclusivity.
Whitley mirrors the trend of other state courts to interpret scheduled injury
sections so as not to limit recovery. 76 Yet, the decision is a major departure

from North Carolina precedent. The reason behind the court's change seems
best explained by one line in Whitley: "Equity strongly supports the result we
reach in this case." 77 The court apparently was so swayed by the desire to compensate the injured worker fully that it reinterpreted events surrounding a fortyfour-year-old session law to create a major new precedent in North Carolina
workers' compensation law. 78 The Whitley court's explanation of the general
assembly's intent is merely one of several logical readings of why the general
assembly adopted the "in lieu of" clause. 7 9 It is difficult to assume that when
the general assembly adopted the "in lieu of" clause in 1943, it did not expect
the Industrial Commission and the courts to take this as an indication that the
legislature was intentionally adopting the rule of exclusivity which those words
surely created. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in 1930 the Industrial Commission interpreted the omission of those exact words from the North
Carolina act to mean that double recovery was possible for total incapacity and
scheduled loss, and, consequently, if the general assembly had included the
clause, it would mean the sections could not operate together.80 Furthermore,
in the same year the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning in
Rice.81 Therefore, the general assembly should have been aware that if it intended a result other than exclusivity, it should adopt different language. Certainly, the fact that the general assembly added the words "including
disfigurement" to the clause implies that the legislature meant to preclude
double recovery for disfigurement. But if the general assembly only wanted to
address the disfigurement issue, it would not have adopted words it knew by case
law and by comparable statutes to have an entirely different effect. 8 2 The most
probable interpretation of the intent of the general assembly is that it meant to
76. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 6, § 58.23, at 10-344.86.
Although it is difficult to speak in terms of a majority rule on this point, because of
significant differences in statutory background it can be said that at one time the doctrine
of exclusiveness of schedule allowances did dominate the field. But in recent years there
has developed such a strong trend in the opposite direction that one might now, with equal
justification, say that the field is dominated by the view that schedule allowances should
not be deemed exclusive.
Id. at § 58.32, at 10-344.86; see, eg., Jacks v. Banister Pipelines Am., 418 So.2d 524 (La. 1982);
Donahue v. Thdmas H. Bradley, Inc., 90 A.D.2d 611, 456 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1982).
77. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 89, 348 S.E.2d at 342.

78. See id. at 96-97, 348 S.E.2d at 340-41.
79. See Note, supra note 71, at 1465 ("Unfortunately, the clause's legislative history is inconclusive. The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the clause may be viewed as supporting
either the Perry or the [Whitley] rule.").
80. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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prevent double recovery under sections 97-29 and 97-31 and to prevent double
recovery for disfigurement. By adopting the words "shall be in lieu of all other
compensation," it achieved the former, and by adopting the words "including
disfigurement," it expressly achieved the latter. The supreme court initially
adopted the exclusivity interpretation, but the inequitable results of limited recovery compelled the court to alter its decision.
The Workers' Compensation Act, however, was never intended to be equi-

table in all situations. 83 The statute as adopted is a trade-off between the worker
and the employer to ensure faster and more definite recovery and to eliminate

litigation as much as possible. 84 Inequities are inherent in such a system, and
especially so in section 97-31. Through the schedule, the general assembly has

enumerated specific instances in which the amount of recovery is dictated in the
statute itself. Compensation in those particular cases is even more certain and
rapid than with other injuries. Some workers, however, have a good chance of
not being fully compensated, but this is part of the trade-off for the certain recovery. 8 5 The general assembly, measuring the costs and benefits of such a sys-

tem, adopted it knowing full well that such inequities would result.8 6 Therefore,
those inequities should not influence a court when interpreting the Act.

The Whitley decision will result in more litigation as injured employees try
to get section 97-29 recovery while employers try to limit the decision. North
Carolina Court of Appeals cases decided since Whitley indicate that the standard necessary to allow an employee with a scheduled injury to recover under

section 97-29 will not be strict. 87 The Commission must find only that the plaintiff is incapable of earning the wages earned before the injury in the same or

88
other employment, and that the plaintiff's incapacity is caused by his injury.
"'The relevant inquiry... is not whether all or some persons with the plaintiff's
degree of injury are capable of working and earning wages, but whether the

plaintiff herself has such capacity.'

"89

Thus, the tests for total incapacity are

83. See Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
U.S. Dept of Labor, 449 U.S. 268, 281 (1980).
Respondents... argue that the Act should be interpreted in a manner which provides
a complete and adequate remedy, to an injured employee. Implicit in this argument, however, is the assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to provide disabled workers
with a complete remedy for their industrial injuries. The inaccuracy of this implicit assumption undercuts the validity of respondents' argument.
Id.
84. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
85. "The schedule brings a windfall to the worker in some cases and gross hardship to the
worker in others." Graves v. Eagle Iron Works, 331 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Iowa 1983); see Note, Permanent Partial Disability Under Worker's Compensation: Schedule Exclusivity Versus Impaired
EarningCapacity, 33 DRAKE L. Rv. 885, 888 (1984).
86. Fleming, 312 N.C. at 548, 324 S.E.2d at 222 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
87. See Mitchell v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 661, 353 S.E.2d 638 (1987); Wilder v.
Barbour Boat Works, 84 N.C. App. 188, 352 S.E.2d 690 (1987); Cockman v. PPG Indus., 84 N.C.
App. 101, 351 S.E.2d 771 (1987); Taylor v. Margaret R. Pardee Memorial Hosp., 83 N.C. App. 385,
350 S.E.2d 148 (1986).
88. See, eg., Taylor, 83 N.C. App. at 389, 350 S.E.2d at 151 (1986).
89. Wilder, 84 N.C. App. at 194, 352 S.E.2d at 693 (quoting Little v. Anson County Schools
Food Serv., 295 N.C. 527, 531, 246 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1978)).
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now used to examine scheduled injury accidents. 90 The tests reverse the usual
method of inquiry for worker's compensation cases. Instead of first looking to
see if the injury is included in section 97-31 and then stopping if the injury is in
the schedule, the Commission must now examine all serious injuries as possible
total incapacity cases. Certainly this new method will increase litigation because
advocates will try to establish the details needed to prove disability and earn

recovery under section 97-29. 91 The court in Whitley, for example, allowed total
incapacity recovery for a sixty-year-old man with a fourth grade education who
had lost substantial use of his hands. 92 A twenty-year-old man with the same
injury and similar background could be placed in special training and probably

would be restricted to section 97-31 recovery. But what about a forty-five-yearold man, a fifty-year-old man, or a fifty-five-year-old man in the same circumstances? These examples would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis and

would depend on subjective particulars that necessarily would require expert
testimony and intensified litigation, thus resulting in delayed recovery.

The costs and increased delays may be justified by the more equitable results. But, is it within the province of the courts to reinterpret this statute? The
dissenters argue that it is not.93 A plain reading of the statute, they maintain, is
that recovery under the scheduled section operates in lieu of recovery under any
other section. 94 The interpretation given the statute had stood for over forty

years. 95 If this interpretation was in error, it was the general assembly's duty to
correct the error, but it had not done so. 9 6 "In the absence of legislation amending a statute following the court's interpretation of it, the conclusion is ines-

capable that the interpretation is consistent with legislative intent." 97 Yet, the
majority has changed a major component of the Worker's Compensation Act
through the process of judicial legislation.9"

The United States Supreme Court also frowns on judicial legislation. In
90. See id.; Taylor, 83 N.C. App. at 389, 350 S.E.2d at 151.
91. See Taylor, 83 N.C. App. at 388, 350 S.E.2d at 151. "Whether a disability exists is a conclusion of law which must be based on findings of fact supported by competent evidence." Id. (quoting Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 594-95, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982)).
92. See Whitley, 318 N.C. at 90, 348 S.E.2d at 337.
93. See id at 100-01, 348 S.E.2d at 342-43 (Meyer, J., dissenting); id. at 101, 348 S.E.2d at 343
(Billings, J., dissenting, Branch, C.J., and Meyer, J., concurring in the dissent).
94. Id. at 101, 348 S.E.2d at 343 (Billings, J., dissenting).
95. The "in lieu of" clause was adopted in 1943. See supra note 26. The language was held to
require exclusivity until Whitley. See supra notes 58, 61-75 and accompanying text.
96. See Whitley, 318 N.C. at 100, 348 S.E.2d at 343 (Billings and Meyer, J.J., and Branch, C.J.,
dissenting).
97. Id. (Billings and Meyer, J.J., and Branch, C.J., dissenting).
98. The North Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized that judicial legislation is forbidden. See Rice v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 199 N.C. 154, 154 S.E. 69 (1930).
There is a marked distinction between liberal construction ofstatutes by which courts,
from the language used, the subject-matter, and the purposes of those framing them, find
out their true meaning, and the act of a court in ingrafting upon a law something that has
been omitted, which the court believes ought to have been embraced. The former is a
legitimate and recognized rule of construction, while the latter is judicial legislation, forbidden by the constitutional provisions distributing the powers of government among three
departments, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial.
Id. at 157, 154 S.E. at 70 (quoting 25 RULING CASE L. 963, 964 (1919)).
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Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States Dept of Labor 99 the Court held that
under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, an injured
employee could not recover through the section compensating for wage earning
incapacity if he had a scheduled injury.10 0 The Court found nothing in the Act
to indicate that the legislature intended a different meaning other than the plain
language of the statute.10 1 The Court recognized that Workers' Compensation
Acts are designed as a trade-off between the employer and worker, and that "[ilt
therefore is not correct to interpret the Act as guaranteeing a completely adequate remedy for all covered disabilities."'10 2 The statute produces incongruities, but "the federal courts may not avoid them by rewriting or ignoring" the
language of the Act."° 3 If inequities are to be avoided in the Longshoremen's
Compensation Act, only Congress, the Supreme Court wrote, can address
them."o4
Yet in Whitley, the North Carolina Supreme Court found the power to
drastically reinterpret the "in lieu of" clause, even though the general assembly
knew of the court's previous interpretation and did not find it necessary to clarify the statute.'- 5 The court held that the statute was simply misinterpreted
throughout its history.10 6 A better explanation is that the present justices believe the inequitable results of section 97-31 are not justified by speedy and certain compensation. This reasoning may be valid. Cases in which injured
workers are not highly compensated are easy to find.' 0 7 But, the general assembly adopted the system and is the only body that can change it.10 8 The court
reasoned around the problem by concentrating on the events surrounding the
adoption of the "in lieu of" clause in 1943.109 But two facts make their argument unpersuasive. First, the interpretation allowing section 97-29 recovery in
section 97-31 situations is at best merely one of several equally possible interpretations.' 10 Second, the interpretation restricting recovery has been on record for
over thirty years without provoking action from the general assembly."' The
most reasonable explanation for this decision is that the inequities have swayed
the court.
Whitley represents a major change in North Carolina Workmen's Compen99. 449 U.S. 268 (1980).
100. Id. at 271.
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id. at 282.
103. Id. at 283.
104. Id. at 284.
105. See Whitley, 318 N.C. at 100, 348 S.E.2d at 343 (Billings and Meyer, J.J., and Branch, C.J.,
dissenting).
106. See id. at 95-97, 348 S.E.2d at 340-41.
107. See, eg., Gupton v. Builders Transp., 83 N.C. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 601 (1987) (employee
who lost seven percent of vision in right eye which made him ineligible under Interstate Commerce
Commission rules to continue his vocation, truck driving, must recover only under scheduled

provision).
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Potomac Elec. Power Co., 449 U.S. at 284.
See Whitley, 318 N.C. at 95-97, 348 S.E.2d at 340-41.
See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
See, eg., Watts v. Brewer, 243 N.C. 422, 90 S.E.2d 764 (1956).
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sation Law. The decision will allow the Industrial Commission to fashion more
equitable recoveries for workers with serious scheduled injuries.' 12 In order to
make these recoveries possible, the North Carolina Supreme Court completely
reinterpreted a statute whose plain language supported a totally different interpretation.1 13 But the issue is not settled. The general assembly, which should
have been the first to take up the issue, should still address the uncertainty in the
statute. If it does not, the right of permanently injured workers with scheduled
injuries to recover an amount proportionate to their wage-loss is supported only
by a 4-3 decision. The general assembly should decide whether the benefits
gained by abolishing the exclusivity of section 97-31 outweigh the costs of doing
so. Only through its action will the ambiguity of section 97-31 be resolved.
J. CAMERON FURR, JR.

112. See Whitley, 318 N.C. 89 at 348 S.E.2d at 342. The majority wrote,
Equity strongly supports the result we reach in this case. Plaintiff was fifty-eight years
old at the time he was injured. He enjoys no prospect of gainful employment. He will
continue to require benefits for a period long after [section 97-31] becomes depleted. We
do not believe the legislature, as evidenced by the expansion of section [97-29], intended
such an inequitable result to prevail.
113. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.

